CBRN PREVENTION: AN EXPLORATORY OVERVIEW

NATO has decided to extend CBRN defensive measures by including preventive activities. These would considerably reduce the actual CBRN threats faced during missions and operations by stopping actors from acquiring, developing or deploying CBRN capabilities.

Currently, preventive measures are merely limited to regulatory frameworks to prevent predominantly State actors to acquire or produce CBRN weapons, or, at least, to impede that. Increasingly, however, CBRN threat approaches “must account for every stage of an adversary’s potential acquisition, intention and preparation to use, and employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction”.

The interpretation and execution of CBRN prevention was studied in an exploratory project, and the results are documented in this report (Deliverable 1.1.1). Existing viewpoints, predominantly within NATO and the USA, are discussed and interpreted to arrive at a general overview of current ideas, approaches and trends pertaining to this area.

It is apparent from the reviewed documents that CBRN Prevention is described as a collection of countermeasures that aim at lowering or completely removing the occurrence of CBRN incidents using a combination of three interlaced categories of measures:

- Proliferation Prevention: to prevent acquisition of CBRN materials and capabilities,
- Actor-Capability Development Prevention: to frustrate development of CBRN capabilities by potential actors
- Incident Prevention: to stop or defeat a CBRN device before its actual deployment.

Examples of preventive measures belonging to these layers are provided in the text.

This document serves as a foundation and guidance for future research within the CBRN prevention domain and should allow to focus future efforts onto aspects which are relevant for the MoD or affiliated organisations, for instance towards doctrine development.